On Monday, November 16, visitors to some of the most trusted websites on the internet were served malicious code, and nobody at those companies knew. The attack did not break into the BBC or CNN. It went one level up, into Optimizely, whose testing tool those sites load on every page. One compromised supplier, and suddenly the morning news came with a thief attached. This Optimizely cyberattack is the kind of breach security people have warned about for years, and it finally happened at full scale.
How one script reached 178 websites
Optimizely Web Experimentation is a tool big websites use to test small changes, a different headline here, a moved button there. To do that, sites load a snippet of Optimizely code on every page. An attacker found a flaw in the product, got inside customer projects, and rewrote the JavaScript those snippets deliver.
The security firm Report URI, which monitors the third-party scripts websites run, mapped the damage. It checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. The list includes the BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely’s own site and login page carried the code too.
The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday, in the BBC’s snippet. Optimizely confirmed the incident in a notice posted at 01:02 UTC on Tuesday, saying an unauthorised party had exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product. The company says it has fixed the flaw and removed the code. It has not said how the attacker got in or how many projects were changed.
What the code actually did
The payload was a three-in-one kit, and each part was aimed at money.
First, a crypto clipper. The script, a file called track.js, watched for cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, forms, links and even the clipboard, then quietly replaced them with addresses controlled by the attacker. It covered Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. Copy an address, paste it, and the money goes to the wrong person. Report URI counted about $7,040 in the attacker’s wallets by 19:25 UTC on Monday, all of it arriving within roughly nine hours. StepSecurity, another security firm, put the figure near $6,600, noting some of the addresses were active before the injections.
Second, a card skimmer, added at 13:43 UTC. It grabbed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs typed into a site’s own payment form and sent them to the attacker’s server. One piece of good news: cards typed into hosted payment frames run by companies like Stripe or Adyen were out of reach, because those load as a separate window inside the page. Only forms built into the site itself were exposed, and Report URI says it cannot see how many card numbers were taken.
Third, the code went after iPhones. On Apple phones and iPads it checked the iOS version and, on older ones, tried to load known iOS exploit kits called Coruna and DarkSword. Report URI says it found no iPhones actually taken over. If you run an older iPhone, update iOS now. Our iPhone 17 comparison shows how many Indians now carry Apple’s latest hardware, and every one of those phones was a potential target yesterday.
Why the Optimizely cyberattack should worry Indian users
No Indian victim has been named yet, and no Indian website has appeared on the published list of 178. That is not the same as nobody in India being affected. Millions of Indians visit the BBC and CNN every day, and India has one of the world’s largest crypto user bases. Anyone who copied a wallet address while one of those sites sat open in a tab on Monday could have pasted the attacker’s address instead of their own.
The uncomfortable part is how little anyone could have done. The code came from cdn.optimizely.com, served with Optimizely’s own certificate. No dodgy download, no phishing link. You visited a news site. The news site was fine. The tool behind it was not.
The $7,040 stolen so far is a small sum for an attack this wide. It looks like a proof of concept. The real haul would be the card numbers and cookies. Dozens of companies sit in the same position as Optimizely. The next version of this attack does not need to break into 178 websites. It needs to break into one supplier.
If you moved crypto on Monday, check the destination address against your records. If you typed a card number into any of the named sites, watch your statements and ask your bank about a replacement card. And if your phone keeps nagging you about a software update, stop swiping it away. Android users were not targeted by the iOS kits, and the newest Realme GT 8 Pro ships with years of security patches, but the lesson is the same on every platform: the update you keep postponing closes the door.
The Optimizely cyberattack will be studied for a long time, not because of what was stolen, but because of how easily it was done. One flaw, one supplier, 178 of the biggest names on the web, and a whole day before the code was cleaned up. The question now is not whether this happens again. It is which supplier is next, and whether anyone will notice faster.
